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CIETAC's

CALCULATIONS ON LOST PROFITS UNDER

ARTICLE

74

OF THE

CISG

Sharon G. K. Singh & Dr. Bruno Zellert
Introduction

I.

In China, it is said, "[i]n death, avoid hell; in life, avoid the law courts."' The
remarks, made by Thomas Klitgaard in his address to the Northern Californian
International Arbitration Club in 2005, address the Chinese view toward litigation. 2 Given the rise of arbitration as a form of alternative dispute resolution in
China and the prevailing reputation of its legal system, this paper concentrates on
the work undertaken by the Chinese International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission ("CIETAC"), and how it resolved the calculation of lost profits
under Article 74 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"). 3 This is particularly of interest because
CIETAC, in one form or other, has existed since 1956, well before the CISG was
ratified in 1980.
Furthermore, claiming lost profits from a breach of contract is not specifically
recognized in Chinese contract law. Article 113 of the 1999 revision of the Chinese Contract Law provides that "the amount of damages payable shall be
equivalent to the other party's loss resulting from the breach, including any benefit that may be accrued from performance of the contract, provided that the
amount shall not exceed the likely loss resulting from the breach which was
foreseen or should have been foreseen by the breaching party at the time of conclusion of the contract." 4 In other words, the amount of compensation for losses
must be equal to the losses caused by the breach, including the interest receivable
after the performance, provided that they do not exceed the probable losses
caused by breach of contract.
In contrast, Article 74 of the CISG specifically states, "[d]amages for breach
of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of
t
Sharon Singh, Victoria University, Melbourne; Dr. Bruno Zeller, Associate Professor, Victoria
University, Melbourne, Adjunct Professor, Murdoch University, Perth. The authors would also like to
thank Al Kritzer from Pace University for his suggestions and reading of an earlier draft.
I Thomas J. Klitgaard, Esq., Address to the Northern California International Arbitration Club, Arbitration in the Peoples Republic of China, May 11, 2005, outline available at http://www.wirepaladin.
comlArbitration%20in%2OChina.pdf.
2

See id.

At this stage up to 179 CIETAC case translations are available in translated form. However, very
few were decided after 2000, when the new Chinese Contract Law was promulgated. Hence, this study
relies only on pre-2000 cases. See Article 74: CIETAC and PRC Case Annotations, http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cisg/text/CIETAC-PRC-74.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2007). Al Kritzer, in correspondence
with the authors, suggests that there are at least 200 cases subsequent to January 2000 that he has not
seen yet.
4 Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, Chapter 7, Article 113 (adopted and promulgated
by the Second Session of the Ninth Nat'l Peoples Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1,1999), Chinese
Civil Law Forum, available at http://www.cclaw.net/download/contractlawPRC.asp.
3
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profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach."' 5 The CISG
specifically envisions that lost profits are to be taken into consideration when
calculating damages, whereas the Chinese Contract Law has not done so. However, this does not mean that the inclusion of lost profits is not possible under
Chinese contract law. Lost profits may be included in the term "equal to the
loss," found in the Chinese Contract Law. The CISG specifically included lost
profits as an obligatory item in the calculation of loss under Article 74. The
Secretariat's Commentary to the CISG states that this inclusion was deemed necsystems the concept of loss standing alone does
essary "because in some legal
6
not include loss of profit."
Scholars argue whether lost profits are, or should be, consistently part of the
Chinese remedial scheme and how lost profits should be calculated. This article
does not examine whether loss of profit is consistently applied in the calculation
of losses, but instead aims to identify and examine the methods adopted by
CIETAC to calculate lost profits under Article 74 of the CISG. To this end, this
article evaluates the published decisions by CIETAC since the inception of the
CISG in China, and also discusses whether or not CIETAC's decisions on lost
profits under Article 74 are uniform and consistent with international
interpretations.
CIETAC's methodology has not been readily apparent until recently. Previously, CIETAC decisions were either available only in Chinese or not at all.
However, as translated decisions become more readily available, the methodology and analysis of the tribunal becomes clearer. A study of CIETAC decisions
is important, as it serves as an illustration of the growing integration of international law into China's legal framework. Indeed, China's development into an
economic superpower has led to trade liberalization, which, in turn, has brought
an ever-increasing number of conflicts between parties to trade contracts. This
article will attempt to reveal how Chinese arbitration is conducted by examining
the important issue of how to calculate lost profits suffered by an aggrieved
party.
Furthermore, this study is restricted to an investigation of Article 74 of the
CISG, and specifically, the awarding of lost profits in cases where a contract has
been breached. First, lost profits are an integral and important part of Article 74.
Second, as stated earlier, Chinese contract law does not specifically recognize
lost profits as an automatic right when claiming damages for breach of contract.
If CIETAC correctly applies Article 74, one of the contentious issues in applying
the CISG would be resolved, and further study could confidently move forward.
Part I of this article provides a brief history of CIETAC, which is necessary to
appreciate the work completed by the Chinese Arbitration system. Part II discusses the issue of lost profits within the context of Article 74 of the CISG,
describing the methodology of international jurisprudence and considering sev5 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. II, 1980, 19
I.L.M. 668, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html [hereinafter
CISGI.
6 Secretariat Commentary, Guide to CISG Article 74, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/
secomm-74.html (last visited March 15, 2007).
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eral academic works. Part III provides an overview of lost profits in general.
Part IV analyzes specific CIETAC decisions on lost profits and how damages are
calculated under Article 74. Part V draws together and discusses those inconsistencies found during examination of the CIETAC decisions. Parts VI and VII
summarizes the trend in CIETAC decisions and draws together conclusions on
how to strengthen the tribunal on the international stage.
II. A Brief History of CIETAC
The foundations of CIETAC date back to 1956. This half-century history of
CIETAC sheds light on economic and political changes within China that have
put the country into the forefront of economic growth. CIETAC began as the
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission ("FTAC") when the China Council for
the Promotion of International Trade first inaugurated FTAC in the 1950s. 7 In
1979-1980, FTAC became known as the Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission ("FETAC") upon the inclusion of dispute settlement among
Chinese and foreign joint ventures. Eight years later, in 1988, the Commission
underwent another name change, this time from FETAC to its current name,
CIETAC. 8 The cumulative role of CIETAC and its predecessors was to arbitrate
disputes arising out of foreign trade by Chinese nationals. 9 Along with the name
change to CIETAC in 1988, the arbitration rules were also revised,' 0 which
broadened the scope of CIETAC's jurisdiction and its pool of listed arbitrators.
The aim was to create consistency between the Chinese arbitration system and
those of other players in international arbitration, such as Switzerland.
The new 1988 CIETAC rules specifically permitted the appointment of foreign arbitrators, selected from a limited list that CIETAC first approved. " This
was a significant step in trans-nationalizing CIETAC and the arbitration process,
because prior to these changes, only Chinese nationals were allowed to arbitrate.
In 1989, thirteen non-Chinese nationals were added to the CIETAC panel of arbitrators, eight from Hong Kong and five from various other countries.' 2 Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority, ninety-six of the CIETAC arbitrators in total,
were Chinese nationals.
In 1994, the CIETAC panel of arbitrators and the 1988 CIETAC rules underwent another significant reform. The number of foreign arbitrators on the panel
was pushed to sixty, thereby increasing the perception of CIETAC neutrality in
7 Bonnie Hobbs, CIETAC Arbitration Rules and Procedures: Recent Developments and Practical
Guidelines, 2, Apr. 1999, http://www.omm.com/webcode/webdata/content/publications/CIETAC.PDF.
8 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, Arbitration Rules, (revised and
adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of Int'l Trade/China Chamber of Int'l Commerce, Jan.
11, 2005, effective May 1, 2005), available at http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/rules/rules.htm. [hereinafter CIETAC 2005].
9 Hobbs, supra note 7, at 2.
10 Given effect from October 1, 2000, CIETAC also uses the name Arbitration Institute of China
Chamber of International Commerce of the People's Republic of China ("IAC").
1 CIETAC 2005, supra note 8, art. 4.
12 Hobbs, supra note 7, at 2-3; Paulsson & Alastair Crawford, 1994 Revision of CIETAC Rules
Promises Increased Neutrality in Arbitration in China, 9(6) MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 17, June 1994.
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international trade cases .13 Furthermore, CIETAC adopted internationally accepted arbitration rules by modeling themselves after the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules ("UNCITRAL Model
Law"), the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") rules, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce rules. 14
Subsequent amendments in 1995, 1998, and most recently in 2005, have been
structured to ensure that CIETAC continues to remain competitive in an increasingly global market.' 5 One change allows parties to freely choose the language
of arbitration, instead of automatically defaulting to Chinese. 16 Another significant change allows the parties, through mutual consent, to select arbitrators from
outside CIETAC's panel of arbitrators, with the proviso that the chairman must
approve the selection (thus, still allowing CIETAC to maintain some control over
7
the conduction of proceedings).'
The expansion of external arbiters' involvement in tribunal proceedings has
arguably resulted in an increase in arbiters who possess a greater breadth of
knowledge and experience to adjudicate cases. 18 Currently, CIETAC has 206
foreign arbitrators out of 738 total arbitrators for foreign-related disputes.' 9
With the emergence of China as an economic power and the recent boom in
trade, CIETAC has become one of the most active international commercial arbitration bodies in the world.2 0 In 2000, CIETAC heard 543 arbitration cases,
compared to 500, 541, and 294 cases heard by the American Arbitration Association, the International Arbitration Centre, and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, respectively. 2 ' However, skepticism surrounding CIETAC since
its inception has not completely subsided, and critical analysis of its decisions is
still required. This skepticism mainly focuses on China's communist regime and
the political considerations surrounding its state instrumentalities, including
CIETAC. Consequently, some commentators argue that certain CIETAC decisions have the perception of partiality or prejudice-which negatively affects
confidence in the global arbitration system as a whole.
13 Victor
14

Perez, CIETAC, 12

FLA.

J.

INT'L

L. 491, 494 (2000).

See Hobbs, supra note 7, at 3-5, for an explanation as to the depth of modeling.

15 Id.
16

CIETAC 2005, supra note 8, art. 67.

17 Id.,
art. 21.
18 Edward Alder & Rosamund Cresswell, CIETAC Arbitration Rules Revised, Bird & Bird, May
2005, http://www.twobirds.com/English/publications/articies/CIETAC-arbitration-rules-revised.cfm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
19 China International Trade and Arbitration Commission, Panel of Arbitrators for Domestic Disputes, http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/arbitrators/arbitrators-nl.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
20 Li Zhang, The Enforcement of CIETAC Arbitration Awards, HONG KONG LAW., February 2002,
available at http: //www.hk-lawyer.com/2002-2/FebO2-china.htm.
21 International Arbitration Cases Received, HONG KONG INT'L ARB. CENTRE (2006), http://www.
hkiac.org/HKIAC/HKIAC-English/en-statistics.html#top (last visited March 15, 2007) (noting the following annual numbers of arbitrations have taken place with CIETAC from January 2000 until 2005,
respectively: 543, 731, 684, 709, 850, and 979).
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Keeping in mind that the CISG became effective on January 1, 1988,22
CIETAC has been exposed to the international standard for quite some time,
23
allowing it to observe international convention and jurisprudence in action.
However, CIETAC's interpretations of the CISG present a broad view of how
key provisions should be interpreted to maintain the effectiveness of the Convention and avoid ethnocentric interpretations. 24 One of the issues addressed in the
CISG is how to calculate damages and, specifically, loss of profits. 25 CIETAC,

like its other international counterparts, will no doubt be tested on the methods it
employs in determining this issue.
III.

Lost Profits: A General Overview

The obligation, or right, to claim lost profits is contained within Article 74 of
the CISG. 26 Article 74 covers both reliance 27 and expectation interests, 28 with

expectation interests providing the limitation for recovery. 2 9 However, the CISG
does not explicitly use the terms "reliance interest" and "expectation interest"
when providing for compensation. 30 In this article, reference to these terms is
only made because they are still in use (despite the terms' misleading and gener31
ally unhelpful character).
22

See 1980-United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods (CISG),

UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/sale-goods/1980CISG.html (last visited
Mar. 28, 2007).
23 Id. China exercised its right to opt out of Article 1(b) and II of the CISG. Note that Article 10 of
the Chinese Contract Law no longer requires contracts to be concluded in writing and therefore the
reservation is inconsistent with Article 10 of the CCL.
24 See CISG, supra note 5, art. 7(l) ("In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of
good faith in international trade.").
25 Victor Knapp, Article 74, in BIANCA-BONELL COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW
538-48, (Dott A. Giuffr6 ed., 1987), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/knapp-bb74.
html.
26 CISG, supra note 5, art. 74. Article 74 reads in full, "Damages for breach of contract by one party
consists of the sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit suffered by the other party as a consequence
of the breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have
foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he
then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract."
27 Reliance, in the realm of contract law, is the principle that an aggrieved party has the right to be
put into the situation in which it would have been had the contract never been performed.
28 Expectation interests refer to the principle that a party has the right to be placed in the same
economic position it would have been in had the contract been properly performed.
29

BRUNO ZELLER, DAMAGES UNDER THE CONVENTION

ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL

43-44 (2005); see also Joseph Lookofsky, The 1980 United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAws-CoNTRACTS, Suppl. 29 (R. Blanpain & J. Herbots eds., 2000) available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/
biblio/lookofsky.html.
30 ZELLER, supra note 29, at 39.
31 For reasons why and further details of this view, see David W. McLaughlan, Reliance Damages
for Breach of Contract (unpublished conference paper, on file with authors).
SALE OF GOODS,
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The first sentence of Article 74 clearly provides for two categories of losses:
actual losses (damnum emergens) and loss of profit (lucrum cessans).32 Despite
this broad language, Article 74 does not define in detail which losses can be
compensated or how they are to be calculated. Consequently, liability is determined by the general principle of full compensation, taking into account the particular purpose of the contract in question. 33 The principle of full compensation
provides that the aggrieved party is entitled to full compensation for harm sustained as a result of the breach. The harm can include any loss suffered and any
deprivations of gain. Put differently, "[A]rticle 74 aims to give an aggrieved
party the right to put themselves back into the position they were in had the
contract been properly performed. '' 34 Therefore, when the full compensation
principle is properly applied it necessarily includes loss of profit.
Lost profits are differentiated from the actual loss category. Actual loss "generally means the diminution in the assets of an injured party at the time of the
conclusion of the contract, loss of profit [on the other hand] means the loss of any
increase in the assets caused by the breach."'3 5 Hence, a loss of profit represents
the difference between the aggrieved party's assets if the contract had been adequately performed and the aggrieved party's assets absent the breach of contract. 36 It follows from the principle of full compensation that such
compensation is to be made not only for lost profits prior to the date of judgment,
but also for any foreseeable and calculable profit that would have been achieved
after the judgment date. 37 Losses are not merely38confined to actual losses, but
include future losses and loss of chance as well.
The CISG does not provide specific rules on how to calculate loss of profits.
Consequently, some commentators have observed that there is an assumption that
the injured party may recover lost profits suffered, or expected to suffer, without
39
limitation on the period of time for which the injured party may recover.
Therefore, the aggrieved party under the CISG "should be able to demand compensation of any profit lost as a consequence of the breach of contract by the
32

See

CHENGWEI

Liu, REMEDIES

FOR NON-PERFORMANCE:

PERSPECTIVES FROM

CISG, UNIDROIT

PRINCIPLES & PECL (2003), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/chengwei.html.
33 Knapp, supra note 25; PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & INGEBORG SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN
12-14 (2nd ed. 2005).
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS-CISG, art. 74,

34 ZELLER, supra note 29 at 117. It should also be noted that Article 74 also makes it clear that the
contractual liability is not unlimited. Three rules are contained within the CISG that are pertinent in
circumstances when damages are claimed: the foreseeability rules pursuant to Article 74 and the duty to
mitigate damages as explained in Article 77 and Article 79, which set out the exemptions due to unexpected circumstances.
35 Djakhongir Saidov, Methods of Limiting Damages Under the Vienna Convention on Contractsfor
the InternationalSale of Goods, 14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 307, 317 (2002).
36 CLAUDE WITz, HANNS-CHRISTIAN SALGER, & MANUEL LORENZ, INTERNATIONAL EINHEITLICHES

KAUFRECHT. PRAKTIKER-KOMMENTAR UND VERTRAGSGESTALTUNG ZUM CISG, ART.
37 JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE

38

art. 74, 404 (3d ed. 1999).
ZELLER, supra note 29 at 127-31.

39

Knapp, supra note 25.

74,

1980

15 (2000).

UNITED NATIONS

CONVENTION,
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other party."4 0 The amount is limited only by foreseeability and the full compensation rules as set out in Article 74.
However, the full compensation rule does not suggest that an award for profits
is possible. The wording of Article 74 makes it clear that only lost profits are
recoverable. The plaintiff must show that profits indeed were achievable and that
the business was not taking on losses. 4 1 It follows, therefore, that compensation
is only made for those losses that are a consequence of the breach, and the plain42
tiff would be limited in his recovery to the extent of the balance sheet analogy.
IV. CIETAC Decisions Regarding the Calculation of Loss of Profits
under Article 74
As pointed out above, Article 74 does not explicitly provide a loss of profit
calculation. However, Article 74 does make it clear that damages cannot exceed
full compensation. 43 In effect, damages under Article 74 are capped by the general principle of full compensation.
CIETAC's decisions since 1988 have adopted a variety of different methods to
calculate lost profits under Article 7 4. 44 Hence, the appropriate method of calculating lost profits under the CISG is disparate and unclear. This in itself is not
unusual in light of international practice and varying factual situations which
parties face. An analysis of CIETAC decisions suggests that the awards which
are made under the category of lost profits can be classified into eight broad
categories: 45 (1) seller's lost profits calculated as the difference between the contract price and the actual production cost of the goods; (2) the difference between
the contract price between the seller and the buyer and the contract price between
the seller's supplier and the seller; (3) the price difference between the contract
price and the price of actual resale; (4) the buyer's lost profits calculated as his
anticipated net profits (anticipated gross profits minus fees payable); (5) the price
difference between the contract price and the price of the intended resale to subbuyer (minus costs of resale); (6) the difference between the prices of the intended resale to sub-buyer and the actual resale made; (7) the price difference
according to the calculations set out in Article 76; and (8) the awarding loss
40

Id.

Saidov, supra note 35.
42 It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss types of losses. However, one must keep in mind
that if a party would have suffered a loss in performing under a contract, that loss would diminish the
actual recoverable damages. The ultimate aim is to put the claimant or plaintiff into a position as if the
contract would have been performed. Hence a breach can actually amount to a profit for the plaintiff. In
such a case, the plaintiff ought to compensate the respondent or defendant under the principle of good
faith.
43 CISG, supra note 5, art. 74.
41

44 See infra Part IV for an in depth analysis of the varying methods used by CIETAC in calculating
lost profits.
45 For further analysis on CIETAC awards, see Dong Wu, CIETAC's Practiceson the CISG, NoPuc
J, OF COM. L. (2005), available at http://www.njcl.fl2/2OO5/article2.pdf.
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profits as well as price difference under Article 75 or 76 and associated calculations to either party.4 6
By no means, however, are the calculations restricted to such categories.
CIETAC's arbitration tribunals have been amiable to the methods of calculations
as stipulated by the parties as well. 47 CIETAC has sought to adopt those meth-

ods as appropriate when suitable evidence is provided in support of the parties'
method of calculation. 48 In order to fully understand the different approaches
used by CIETAC in calculating lost profits, the brief facts and holdings of the
decisions are discussed below. This analysis will assist in future understandings
of the Chinese arbitral process.
A. Seller's Lost Profits Calculated as the Difference between the Contract
Price and the Actual Production Cost of the Goods
In the Semi-Automatic Weapons Case (7 August

1993), 4 9

a United States

buyer contracted with a Chinese seller to purchase 5000 guns per year for three
years. The guns were to be manufactured according to the buyer's specifications.
In preparation for the delivery of the first shipment of 5000 guns, the seller requested payment. The American buyer responded that it could not make payment, claiming that it could not obtain the necessary authorization to import the
guns into the United States. The seller applied to arbitrate its claim, and together
with other damages, submitted an amount of expected profits from the first shipment which were lost due to the buyer's breach of the contract. The basis for the
calculation was the profit expected using Free on Board ("FOB") 50 pricing, as
opposed to the Cost Insurance and Freight ("CIF") 5 1 pricing stipulated in the
contract, per gun, minus the seller's cost per gun multiplied by the quantity to be
delivered. The tribunal accepted this calculation, and provided an award accordingly. This method for reaching such a calculation is in line with the principles
of the CISG. By providing FOB pricing as opposed to the CIF pricing under the
contract, the tribunal avoided unduly enriching the seller for costs it had not yet
incurred.
In the Frozen Beef Case (26 October 1993),52 a United States buyer entered
into a contract with a Chinese seller to purchase 200 tons of beef, payment of
46

See infra Part IV (outlining the different categories and calculations of lost profits awards).

47

Id.
Id.

48

49 Semi-Automatic Weapons (P.R.C. v. U.S.), CIETAC (1993), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.
edu/cases/930807c I.html.
50 Intercoms, http://www.ltdmgmt.com/incoterms.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). FOB is used here
as defined by the Incoterms 2000. A FOB term requires the seller to deliver goods on board a vessel
designated by the buyer. The seller fulfils its obligations to deliver when the goods have passed over the
ship's rail.
51 Id. CIF is used here as defined by the Incoterms 2000. A CIF term requires the seller to arrange
for the carriage of goods by sea to a port of destination, and provide the buyer with the documents
necessary to obtain the goods from the carrier.
52 Frozen Beef (P.R.C. v. U.S.), CIETAC (1993), availableat http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/9310
26c I .html.
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which was to be effectuated by a letter of credit. Upon the seller receiving the
letter of credit, it noticed that additional terms not included in the original agreement were inserted. The seller asked the buyer to issue another letter of credit in
line with the parties' agreement. When the buyer failed to alter the letter of
credit and negotiations failed, the seller applied for arbitration. The seller provided two different methods of calculations for loss of profits. The first of which
will be discussed in the fourth method. 5 3 The second calculation was based upon
the contract price minus the seller's expected cost of the beef not yet produced.
Such a calculation could not be based on actual costs but expected or anticipated
ones. The arbitral tribunal implicitly agreed that such a calculation was appropriate; however, the tribunal failed to award the calculated amount due to lack of
evidence. Almost certainly, the tribunal would have agreed to award the seller
to which it was entitled under the contract, had the
reimbursement of the bargain
54
evidence been available.
B. Seller's Lost Profits Calculated as the Difference between the Buyer's and
Seller's Contract Price and the Contract Price of the Seller's Supplier and
the Seller
This calculation arguably rests on the same methodology as described in the
immediately preceding section above, except the manufacturer is now replaced
by a seller who can also be a wholesaler. For example, in the Hot-Rolled Steel
Plates Case (10 May 1996), 55 a Singaporean seller and a Chinese buyer entered
into a contract for the supply of 10,000 tons of hot rolled steel plates. When the
buyer failed to pay for 2000 tons of the product, the seller took its claim to
arbitration seeking its lost profits, among other damages. The tribunal deemed
that the loss of profits should be calculated according to the difference between
the contract price with the buyer and the supplier respectively. 56 In the Steel Coil
Case (31 December 1999) 57 the arbitral tribunal awarded a seller lost profits calculated using the same methods. 58
C. Seller's Lost Profits Calculated as the Price Difference between the
Contract Price and the Price of Resale Actually Made
The Chrome-Plating Machines Production-Line Equipment Case (12 July
1996) 59 involved a Swiss seller and a Chinese buyer who signed a contract providing for the sale of a set of chrome-plating production-line equipment at the
53

See infra Part IV.D.

54 Frozen Beef, supra note 52.
55 Hot-Rolled Steel Plates (Sing. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1996), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.
edu/cases/9605 1Oc 1.html.
56 Id.
57 Steel Coil (P.R.C. v. Switz.), CIETAC (1999), availableat, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/9912
31c.html.
58 Id.

59 Chrome-Plating Machines Production-Line Equipment (Switz. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1996), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/960712cl.html.
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price CIF Shanghai at 257,070 Swiss francs. The buyer failed to pay the contract
price, causing the seller to resell at a lower price. The tribunal awarded the seller
lost profits for the price difference between the resale amount and the contract
price of the machines had the contract been fully performed.
The tribunal applied similar calculations based upon Article 75 of the CISG in
the Nickel-Plating Machines Production-Line Equipment Case (12 July 1996),60
the Dioctyl Phthalate Case (16 August 1996),61 the Yam-Dyed Fabric Case (21
July 1997),62 the Chrome-PlatingProduction Line Equipment Case (12 February
1999),63 the New Zealand Raw Wool Case (8 April 1999), 64 and the Industrial
Raw Materials Case (4 June 1999).65
D. Buyer's Lost Profits Calculated as the Buyer's Anticipated Net Profits
(Anticipated Gross Profits Minus Fees Payable)
In the Tin Plate Case (17 October 1996),66 a Korean seller and Chinese buyer
entered into a contract for the supply of Korean tin plates. The seller defaulted
on the contract by failing to deliver the goods as stipulated, resulting in the buyer
bringing an arbitration proceeding. The buyer sought compensation of 432,200
yuan for the loss of expected profit under the contract. This was calculated by
determining the domestic sales contract price less the cost under the present contract and less other expenses. Import duties and gains taxes, however, were not
deducted, and the seller subsequently argued that they should have been. The
tribunal accepted the majority of the seller's calculations and awarded the loss of
expected profit as the difference between the contract price and the price under
the sales contract. The tribunal, however, stated that the amount of the loss of
expected profit should be the contract price for domestic sales contract: the sum
of the contract price, customs duties, and gains taxes. 67
60 Nickel-Plating Machines Production-Line Equipment (F.R.G. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1996), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960712c2.html.
61 Dioctyl Phthalate (P.R.C. v. N. Korea), CIETAC (1996), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/960816c I .html.
62 Yam-Dyed Fabric (P.R.C. v. U.S.), CIETAC (1997), availableat http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
970721cl.html.
63 Chrome-Plating Production-Line Equipment (Switz. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1999), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990212cl.html. In this case, the CIETAC tribunal first rendered its arbitral award on 12 July 1996. The Buyer applied for setting-aside of the award before Beijing Municipal
No. 2 Intermediate People's Court. On October 24, 1997, the Court notified the CIETAC for the latter to
re-arbitrate the case. Based on the notification from the Court, on October 29, 1997 the CIETAC decided
to re-arbitrate. On February 12, 1999, a new CIETAC tribunal rendered this arbitral award.
64 New Zealand Raw Wool (N.Z. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1999), availableat http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cases/990408c l.html.
65 Industrial Raw Material (P.R.C. v. U.S.), CIETAC (1999), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/990604c I .html.
66 Tinplate (N. Korea v. P.R.C.), C1ETAC (1996), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/
wais/db/cases2/961017cl.html. This case can also fall within the category of the price difference between the contract price and the price of the intended resale to sub-buyer (minus costs of resale) as the
buyer changed its pleadings to deduct some costs however not all costs were accounted for.
67 Id.; see Compound Fertilizer (Austl. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1996), available at http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cases/960130cl.html (this case had a similar ruling).
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E. Buyer's Lost Profits Calculated as the Price Difference Between the
Contract Price and the Price of the Intended Resale to Sub-buyer (Minus
Costs of Resale)
In the Palm Oil Case (22 January 1996),68 a Singaporean seller and a Chinese
buyer entered into a contract for the sale of 3000 tons of refined edible palm oil.
Upon the seller's failure to deliver the goods, the buyer sought damages, including loss of profits. The buyer's final calculation of lost profits provided to the
tribunal was based upon the difference between the resale price and the "prime
price," including tax, which the buyer would have received had the seller performed according to the contract. The tribunal accepted this calculation and held
that the CISG and international trade usages also found such a method
appropriate.
A similar approach was followed in the Art Paper Case (12 February 1996),69
the Dried Sweet Potatoes Case (14 March 1996), 70 the Tinplate Case (17 October 1996), and the Carbamide Case (10 July 1997). 7 1 In all of these cases, tribunals held that the loss of profit should be calculated as the difference between the
contract price and the intended price for reselling to the buyer's customer.
F. Buyer's Lost Profits Calculated as the Difference between the Prices of
the Intended Resale to Sub-buyer and the Actual Resale Made
In the Old Corrugated Carton Case (8 March 1996),72 a Dutch seller and a
Chinese buyer entered into a contract for the supply of old corrugated cartons
with certain specifications. The seller's delivery did not correspond to those
specifications, thereby causing the buyer to resell the goods to another one of its
clients for only 600 yuan, as opposed to the 1500 yuan originally contracted for.
The buyer sought the difference in the respective prices as lost profits. The seller
argued that such a calculation should not be accepted, but rather the loss of price
difference claimed by the buyer should be limited to the difference between the
contract price and the market price at that time (implicitly relying upon Article
76). The tribunal rejected the seller's methodology on the basis that the loss as
calculated by the buyer was clearly foreseeable and therefore the seller should be
liable. Similar conclusions were reached in the Heliotropin Case (10 July
1993), 73 the Hot-Rolled Steel Plates Case (16 July 1996),74 the Graphite Elec68 Palm Oil (Sing. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1996), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/
db/cases2/960122c1 .html.
69 Art Paper (U.S. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1996), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960212
c 1.html.
70 Dried Sweet Potatoes (P.R.C. v. Switz.), CIETAC (1996), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/960314c 1.html.
71 Carbomide (U.S. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1997), available at http;//cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/9707
10cl .html.
72 Old Boxboard Corrugated Cartons (Neth. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1996), availableat http://cisgw3.
law.pace.edu/cases/960308c 1.html.
73 Heliotropin (P.R.C. v. U.S.), CIETAC (1993), available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/9307
1Oc l.html.
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trodes Scraps Case (2 June 1997), 75 and the PVC Suspension Resin Case (7 April
1999).76

G.

Buyer's Lost Profits According to the Calculations Set Out in Article 76

Article 76 in essence allows a party-instead of making a cover purchase-to
simply claim the difference between the contract price and the current price at the
time of avoidance. Article 76, despite only being applicable in case of avoidance, does not deprive the aggrieved party from claiming damages which can
only be obtained by taking recourse to Article 74. Hence loss of profit which re
not included in Article 76, and any other incidental losses associated with the
breach of the contract are recoverable under Srticle 74.
Article 76 of the CISG states:
(1) If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the
party claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase or resale
under article 75, recover the difference between the price fixed by the
contract and the current price at the time of avoidance as well as any
further damages recoverable under article 74. If, however, the party
claiming damages has avoided the contract after taking over the goods,
the current price at the time of such taking over shall be applied instead of
the current price at the time of avoidance.
(2) For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the current price is the
price prevailing at the place where delivery of the goods should have been
made or, if there is no current price at that place, the price at such other
place as serves as a reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods.7 7
The Steel Case (19 September 1994)78 involved an Italian seller and a Chinese
buyer who entered into a contract for various forms of steel. The seller could not
deliver on time even after the buyer had granted various extensions. The buyer
initiated arbitration proceedings to avoid the contract and seeking indemnification from the seller for the difference between the contract price and market price
of the goods. The tribunal correctly laid out a three-step process provided for in
Article 76 by stipulating that the burden of proof rests on the buyer. The tribunal
stated the buyer must show:
(1) The domestic market price was reasonable for the purposes of Article
76(2) of the CISG;
74 Hot-Rolled Steel Plates (Austria v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1996), availableat http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.
edu/cases/960716c 1.html.
75 Graphite Electrodes Scraps (P.R.C. v. F.R.G.), CIETAC (1997), available at http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cases/970602c .html.
76 PVC Suspension Resin (U.S. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1997), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/990407c 1.html.
77 CISG, supra note 5, art. 76.
78 Steel (Italy v. P.R.C), CIETAC (1994), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940919cl.
html.
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(2) The loss of profits was suffered by the buyer itself and was foreseen,
or ought to have been foreseen, by the seller when the parties executed
the contract; and
(3) The buyer had taken reasonable measures to mitigate the damages
79
according to Article 77 of the CISG.
The tribunal held that if the buyer claims the difference between the contract
price and the market price, the market price should be the price at the time and
place of delivery-in this case, the price of the goods at the Russian port between
June and July 1993. The tribunal held that the domestic Chinese price at the
same time was not comparable.
In the High Tensile Steel Bar Case (25 October 1994),so a United States seller
and a Chinese buyer contracted for high tensile steel bars. One of the terms of
the contract stipulated that the seller open a performance bond within five business days after receiving the pre-advice letter of credit issued by the buyer. The
seller failed to issue the performance bond and allowed the buyer to cancel the
contract if it so pleased. The buyer took up this option and subsequently claimed
that the seller's breach prevented it from performing a contract with a third party.
The buyer sought reimbursement from the seller for the amount it had to pay
the third party due to the seller's breach. The buyer further sought damages for
anticipated profits, basing its calculation on the difference between the contract
price and the market price according to Article 76. The arbitral tribunal held that
the buyer's calculation of damages was correct and the buyer was entitled to all
damages sought.
Similar approaches were followed in the Australian Raw Wool Case (23 April
1995),81 the Scrap Copper Case (12 January 1996),82 and the Caffeine Case (29
March 1996). 83 In "FeMo" Alloy Case (2 May 1996),84 the tribunal also
awarded the price difference between the contract price and the international
market price calculated under Article 76 of the CISG as the relevant lost profits.
As has been seen, the CISG allows an aggrieved party to claim the difference
between the contract price and the current price at the time of avoidance. Furthermore lost profits, which are not included in the price differential, can also be
claimed via Article 74. However there is an obligation on the aggrieved party to
mitigate the losses as much as possible. If a party fails to do so the actual losses
Id.
80 High Tensile Steel Bar (U.S. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1994), availableat http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/941025c I .html.
81 Australian Raw Wool (Austi. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1995), availableat http://cisgw3.law.pace.edul
cases/950423c I .html.
82 Scrap Copper (U.S. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1996), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/
wais/db/cases2/960112c
I .html.
83 Caffeine (P.R.C. v. H.K.), CIETAC (1996), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/
db/cases2/960329c l.html.
84 "FeMo" Alloy (P.R.C. v. U.S.), CIETAC (1996), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/96
0502c .html.
79
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including loss of profits will be reduced. The reduction of the damages normally
corresponds to the amount that would have been saved if the party had mitigated.
H. Awarding Lost Profits as Well as Price Difference under Article 75 or 76
and Associated Calculations to Either Party
Calculations that invoke the application of Articles 75 or 76 of the CISG are
relatively uncontroversial because they are founded on factual appraisal of the
circumstances. Article 75 states:
If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a
reasonable time after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement or the seller has resold the goods, the party claiming damages may
recover the difference between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74.85
The CISG recognizes that not in all cases an aggrieved party can be satisfied
with monetary compensation. Under certain circumstances the party suffering
the loss has to satisfy third parties, that is, the goods were to be unsold. Therefore Articles 75 and 76 do exactly that. Article 75 covers situations where a
cover purchase needs to be made and Article 76 covers situations where the aggrieved party claims monetrary damages calculated on the difference between the
contract price and the current price for the goods at the time the contract was
avoided. The aggrieved party in essence is put to an election. They either claim
damages and lost profits under Article 75 or Article 76 but never both.
In relation to lost profits, the tribunal has awarded these losses with the rationale that an aggrieved party should not benefit from the breach.8 6 For example,
due to fundamental breach, the buyer in the Cotton Bath Towel Case (26 October
1996) 87 was forced to dispose of the goods below contract price. If the contract
had been performed per the agreement, the buyer could have sold the goods to a
sub-buyer and obtained a profit. 88 In such cases, the tribunal has awarded the
buyer the difference between the contract price and the lower resale price, and
lost profits were calculated as the difference between the contract sale and the
89
intended sale to the sub-buyer.
However, where the aggrieved party is the seller, the tribunal has generally
denied the seller's claim for lost profits in order to preserve the principle of
disallowing over-compensation. The award for the price difference under Arti85 CISG, supra note 5, arts. 75, 76. Articles 75 and 76 provide for a calculation of lost profits in
certain circumstances stipulated in the text of the articles.
86 Canned Mandarin Oranges (P.R.C. v. F.R.G.), CIETAC (1999), available at http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cases/990301c 1.html; Cysteine (P.R.C. v. F.R.G.), CIETAC (2000), available at http://cisgw3.
law.pace.edu/cases/000107c 1.html.
87 Cotton Bath Towel (P.R.C. v. Austl.), CIETAC (1996), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/961026c I html.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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cles 75 and 76 had already covered such lost profits. This approach was also
followed in the Canned Oranges Case (1 March 1999)90 and the Cysteine Case
(7 January 2000).9 1

These cases are good examples within the regime of the CISG demonstrating
that the principle of full compensation requires a reading of all relevant requirements in order to arrive at the correct solution. In the above cases Articles 75, 76
and 77 are the prime articles on which the aggrieved party relied on. However
the principle of full compensation allowed the aggrieved party to fall back onto
Article 74 to achieve the started goal of the CISG namely to bring the parties
back to the position they would have been had the contract been properly
performed.
V.

Inconsistencies

Before CIETAC's basis of mathematical calculations can be analyzed, its interpretation of Article 74 of the CISG must first be addressed. The points of
contention do not arise with CIETAC's mathematical calculations themselves,
but with CIETAC's interpretations of the principles contained within the four
comers of the CISG. This section identifies three areas under which CIETAC's
interpretations conflict with the aim of Article 74 of the CISG: (1) the incorrect
application of the principle of reasonableness; (2) the incorrect treatment of thirdparty transactions; and (3) the inevitably ethnocentric approach taken by
CIETAC.
A.

Criterion of Reasonableness

Reasonableness is an important concept in the CISG, but it has not been applied accurately by CIETAC. The Equipment Case (20 December 1993)92 is
illustrative. In the Equipment Case, a United States seller and a Chinese buyer
entered into a contract for the sale of sets of equipment, the payment of which
was to be effected by letter of credit. The buyer failed to issue the letter of credit
and the seller applied for arbitration. In determining its loss of profits, the seller
sought the difference between the contract price and the cost that the seller paid
to the manufacturer. However, the arbitral tribunal rejected this calculation on
the basis that the profit to be made by the seller was unreasonable and therefore
unforeseen by the buyer.
Many argue that reasonableness of the amount of lost profits cannot be the
basis for awarding loss of profits. Article 74 specifically provides that the princi93
ple of foreseeability will cap the amount of profit an aggrieved party can claim.
90

See Canned Mandarin Oranges, supra note 86.

91 See Cysteine, supra note 86.
92 Equipment (U.S. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1993), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/9312
20c 1.html.
93 CISG, supra note 5, art. 74 ("Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach
foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts
and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of
contract.").

Volume 4, Issue 2

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

225

CIETAC and Lost Profits under the CISG
Foreseeability in the CISG does not stipulate that the party in breach must foresee the exact amount of damage suffered, but rather that some damage could be
suffered. The basis of the arbitral tribunal's reliance upon the criterion of reasonableness in this case can be compared to the criterion of reasonableness in Article
46(2) of the 2005 version of CIETAC Arbitration Rules. Article 46(2) states as
follows:
The arbitral tribunal has the power to decide in the award, according to
the specific circumstances of the case, that the losing party shall compensate the winning party for the expenses reasonably incurred by it in pursuing its case. In deciding whether the winning party's expenses incurred in
pursuing its case are reasonable, the arbitral tribunal shall consider such
factors as the outcome and complexity of the case, the workload of the
winning party and/or its representative(s), and the amount in dispute,
etc.

94

Although this article was not in force at the time of the decision, it no doubt
provides a comparison as to how the tribunal decided the lost profits issue based
on reasonableness. The tribunal's decision would have been correct in law had
Article 74 of the CISG alternately been framed to state that damages for breach
of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of
profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages
must be reasonable and may not exceed the loss, which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract. However, Article 74 of the CISG does not apply a reasonable test, and therefore, the
tribunal arguably erred in its reasoning by placing a criterion of reasonableness,
weighed by factors subject to the discretion of the tribunal, into its interpretation
of Article 74 of the CISG.
We are not arguing that the decision was incorrect, but instead that reliance
upon reasonableness in this context is fraught with danger. It negates party autonomy and the right of a party to be entitled to the bargain for which it contracted. The correct question for the tribunal would have been: are the damages
foreseeable in "light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to
have known as a possible consequence of the breach of contract?" 95
An accurate application of this approach was applied by the tribunal in the
Weaving Machines, Tools and Accessories Case (5 September 1994).96 The tri-

bunal in that case articulated a three-step approach in reaching its decision. First,
subject to the CISG, the breaching party should compensate the aggrieved party
for all losses (including loss of profits) caused by its breach. Second, in light of
the facts and matters of the case, the loss must be foreseeable. Finally, whether

94 CIETAC 2005, supra note 8, art. 46(2).
95 CISG, supra note 5, art. 7.
96 Weaving Machines, Tools and Accessories (Switz. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1994), available at http:/
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940905c2.html.
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the damages claimed by the aggrieved party are reasonable must be ascertained,
97
and not only in the context of whether the damages could have been mitigated.
B.

Third Party Transactions

In many cases goods are bought for the purpose of reselling to a third party. If
the original contract is either avoided or breached the resulting loss will flow on
to the third party. The CISG will allow the buyer to claim these damages from
the original seller.
In the Bicycles Case (11 August 1994), 98 a French buyer and Chinese seller
entered into a contract for bicycles. Upon receiving the bicycles, some were
found to be defective. The seller lowered the price of the goods and the buyer
disposed of the defective products. The buyer claimed damages, including the
lost profits suffered from the avoidance of a sole distributorship contract with a
third party as a result of the non-conforming bicycles. The tribunal rejected the
buyer's claims, stating that the claims "exceed the total contract price, which [the
seller] could not foresee when signing the contract." The tribunal failed to provide sufficient grounds as to the reason claims exceeding the contract price
would be considered unforeseeable.
Contrast the Bicycles Case with the Nickel-Plating Machines Production-Line

Equipment Case (12 February 1999), 99 where the tribunal awarded the seller
damages exceeding the contract value. Specifically, it awarded damages of DM
2,026,439 (not including legal expenses) on a contract valued at only DM
1,550,000. The reasoning provided in the Bicycles Case is insufficient to determine a clear outcome. There are three possible reasons that could arguably be
advanced. First, the buyer could not discharge his burden of proof sufficiently.
Second, the claims exceeded the contract price, and the loss, therefore, is disproportionate and needs to be cut back. Third, the damage suffered was unforeseeable. If the second argument is advanced, then such reasoning is erroneous and
not in line with Article 74 of the CISG, because it would indicate that the arbitral
tribunal placed the emphasis on the fact that the claims exceeded the contract
price and the damage suffered was unforeseeable. This would indicate that the
tribunal, by its own standards, dictated that if at any time damages exceed the
contract price, such damages would automatically be unforeseeable, regardless of
whether the breaching party actually foresaw such a result.
The tribunal in this case further disregarded the damages sought by the buyer
for loss of its distributorship contract with a third party, holding that "this contract signed by [buyer] and France GIB has nothing to do with this case, so it
cannot be used as the basis to calculate damages."' 0 0 Because the buyer's contract with the third party was avoided due to the seller's breach, the requirement
of causation under Article 74 is satisfied. The reasoning by the arbitral tribunal
97 Id.

98 Bicycles (Fr. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1994), available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/94081 Icl.
html.
99 Nickel-Plating Machines Production-Line Equipment, supra note 60.
100 Bicycles, supra note 98.
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that such damages suffered have nothing to do with the case against the seller is
inconsistent with Article 74 of the CISG.
Furthermore, a seller should realize that a buyer who imports bicycles en
masse is likely to resell the goods to consumers. Consequently, if the bicycles
are non-conforming, a reasonable seller should foresee the buyer's lost profits.
In other words, the buyer would suffer losses as a consequence of not being able
to perform its duties to the third party, and the seller ought to have known that
fact. As already stated, a seller does not need to foresee the exact amount of
damages, but rather the seller need only foresee the assumed risk and potential
liability that would result in damages at the conclusion of the contract.101
An illustration of the tribunal's inconsistent decisions is highlighted in the
Lindane Case (31 December 1997).102 Here the buyer requested the tribunal
hold the seller liable for damages claimed by the buyer's client, because the
goods were not delivered. The tribunal noted that the damage claim made by the
buyer's client was a direct result of the seller's failure to deliver the goods to the
buyer, thereby establishing the link of causation. The arbitral tribunal further
noted that because the buyer was a trading company, it should have been selfexplanatory to the seller that the buyer did not aim to purchase the contractual
goods for domestic uses, but for trade purposes (an obvious point if the CISG is
to apply in the first place). 10 3 Therefore, the arbitral tribunal concluded it was
reasonable for the seller to foresee that the failure of its performance to the contract may lead to certain damages to the buyer.
Furthermore, in the High Tensile Steel Bar Case (25 October 1994),104 Dried
Sweet Potatoes Case (14 March 1996),105 and the Hot-Rolled Steel Billets Case
(5 August 1995),106 the arbitral tribunals accepted that buyers had the right to be
compensated for a settlement made with a third party. 10 7 The contract between
the original buyers and the third party was avoided due to the original seller's
breach.
The arbitral tribunal rejected the causal connection between the seller's breach
and the buyer losing a contract with a third party in the Bicycles Case, finding
instead that the contract with the third party had no bearing on the case. This is
inconsistent with international practices and CIETAC's own subsequent decisions. 10 8 It should be noted that a clear distinction between losses and loss of
profits is not always explained, but it can be reasonably assumed that if goods are
101See supra Part Il1.
102 Lindane (Fr. v. P.R.C.) CIETAC (1997), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/971231cl.
html.
103 Id.
104 High Tensile Steel Bar, supra note 80.
105 Dried Sweet Potatoes, supra note 70.
106 Hot Rolled Steel Billets, (U.S. v. P.R.C. and U.S.), CIETAC (1995), availableat http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950805c I .html.
107 See id.; High Tensile Steel Bar, supra note 80; Dried Sweet Potatoes, supra note 70.
108 See, e.g., Hot Rolled Steel Billets, supra note 106.
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either faulty or are not delivered, and hence cannot be sold to a third party, profits will be lost.
C.

Reliance upon Domestic Law

Once the CISG is invoked as the applicable law, recourse to domestic law is
only applied in circumstances where the CISG is either silent on or has specifically excluded the particular issue. 10 9 The principle of uniformity demands that
specifically stipulated by the
the use of domestic law be restricted to situations
I
CISG; that is, the filling of external gaps. 1
One of the unfortunate practices employed by CIETAC arbitrators has been
the application of domestic law in conjunction with the CISG, specifically in
situations where the CISG clearly addresses the issue. This practice is not only
restricted to the calculation of loss of profit but pervades many aspects of case
management. CIETAC decisions refer first to the domestic law, and then its
equivalence in the CISG. The problem with such a practice is that the interpretation of the CISG articles is jeopardized when substituting domestic law to the
CISG or trying to bring about a decision satisfying both domestic and CISG
articles. Rather than applying the international interpretation of the relevant
CISG article, the panel may be tempted to interpret the article in line with domestic law, on the basis that the wording is similar or in some provisions the same.
As a contracting state, China's domestic law should be overridden by the
CISG;111 however, the words "to override and replace" are far too positive and
2 Furthermore, the words "to modify or replace"
final and not sufficiently fluid. 11
would nearly, but not quite, achieve the effect of "to override ' and such "near
precise" language fits much better into Chinese decision making113as it allows interpretation of the CISG within the confines of Chinese policy.
Such observations can be found in various CIETAC decisions. In the Sesame!
Urea Case (13 June 1989), 114 the Monohydrate Zinc Sulfate Case (26 June

1997),115 the BOPP Film Case (8 September 1997),1 16 and the Isobutanol Case

(7 July 1997)," 17 the tribunal insisted upon applying domestic law which sup109 CISG, supra note 5, art. 7(2).
110 BRUNO ZELLER, FOUR-CORNERS-THE METHODOLOGY FOR INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF

UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/4corners.html.
I' CISG, supra note 5, art. 1.
THE

112

BRUNO ZELLER,

TINENTAL EXCHANGE,
113

CISG and China, in CISG AND
Will ed., 1999).

OF GOODS,

Ch. 5, 1 1 (May 2003),

CHINA-THEORY AND PRACTICE: AN INTERCON-

13 (Michael

Id.

114 Sesame/Urea (P.R.C. v. Jordan), CIETAC (1989), available athttp://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/89

0613c1.html.
115 Monohydrate Zinc Sulphate (P.R.C. v. N. Korea), CIETAC (1997), available at http://www.cisg.

law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/970626c I.html.
116

BOPP Film, (N. Korea v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1997), availableat http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/

970908c .html.
117 Isobutanol (P.R.C. v. U.S.), CIETAC (1997), availableat http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/
db/cases2/970707c .html.
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ported the respective articles in the CISG. In the Black Melon Seeds Case (4
April 1997), involving a dispute between a buyer from Hong Kong and a Chinese
seller," 8 the tribunal referred to Article 19 of the Economic Contract Law
("ECL"), which applies to domestic contracts. This reference was unnecessary,
as there was no apparent gap within the CISG, upon which domestic law would
be called to fill. The use of domestic law side by side with the CISG may suggest "that the CISG is not used with confidence in some [Chinese] courts,"''19 or
Chinese tribunals for that matter. In sum, the CISG has to be interpreted first
within its four corners, and only if a gap needs filling should there be any resort
to domestic law. Otherwise, the internationality of the convention is
0
jeopardized. 12
VI.

The Trend

Obvious criticism can be leveled at CIETAC's early decisions. However, such
criticism must be made while taking into consideration that CIETAC is not the
only arbitration organization that has expressed an ethnocentric bias toward its
domestic law. Examples can be found, for instance, in Australia in Downs Investment Pty Ltd v. Perwaja Steel SDN BHD 121 and in the United States in the
22
classic case of Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co. 1 It
should not be surprising that CIETAC has ethnocentric tendencies considering
the cultural and political habitat from which it has emerged.
Over the past decade, CIETAC's decisions on the CISG have become more
consistent with international interpretation. Since 1999, the shift has been dramatic. One example is the Flanges Case (29 March 1999).123 In brief the primary issues in dispute were connected with the existence of deficiencies or
concealed deficiencies of the goods and the authenticity of the testing data. Unfortunately, the decision did not specifically state the law, but the conclusion was
in line with Article 74 of the CISG. Arguably, the arbitrators must have had
CISG Article 74 in mind in reaching the ruling.
This shift may correspond to China's reform of its contract law. In 1999,
China introduced the Chinese Contract Law ("CCL"), which was hailed to be
China's big leap forward in legal reforms, as the CCL sought to bring Chinese
118 Black Mellon Seeds (H.K. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1997), available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/
cases/970404c 1.html.
119 Zeller, supra note 112, at 13.
120 See generally Frank Fisanich, Application of the U.N. Sales Convention in Chinese International
Commercial Arbitration: Implications for International Uniformity, AM. Rev. INT'L. ARB. 101-22
(1999), availableat http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgfbiblio/fisanich.htm (regarding how Chinese arbitrators and lawyers are not applying the CISG uniformly, which poses an international threat).
121 Downs Inv. Pty. Ltd. v. Perwaja Steel SDN BHD, [2000] Q.S. CT. R. 421 (2000), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/001117a2.html.
122 Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., 2004 WL 1535839 (N.D. II. 2004).
123 Flanges (U.S. v. P.R.C.), CIETAC (1999), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990329
cl.html.
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law in line with the law of many developed nations. 124 Most significantly, the
CCL shifted the focus of Chinese contract laws from preserving the characteristics of a centrally planned economy to preparing for an increasingly globalized
economy. The shift was transparent when the CCL abolished the term "economic contract," opting instead to place the principle of freedom of contract as its
25
main priority. 1
Creating uniformity in Chinese contract law was overseen by Chinese administrators who searched the world over for the best practices and invited eminent
academics and scholars to participate in helping China move forward. 126 Among
the main references was the CISG, whose theoretical and practical preparation
facilitated the public appearance of a uniform contract law in China. 127 The CCL
invalidated the ECL applying to domestic contracts and to the special Law on
Technology Contracts and the Law on Contracts Involving Foreign Interests
("FECL"). 128
Since the FECL and the CISG differed on several important issues, 129 some
CIETAC decisions may well have been reached by applying a mixture of the
two, "thereby restricting the effect of the CISG within the ideas of the FECL,
which in turn is tailored towards serving the policies of the Chinese government." 1 30 Some academics have noted that the CCL demonstrates China's willingness to open its legal system to foreign influences and to receive inspiration
from foreign laws.13 ' The new domestic law also allows the Chinese legal system to gain the maturity signified in the concept of freedom of contract, which
32
some claimed had been lacking.'

The trend of CIETAC decisions being more consistent with international interpretations of the CISG and relying less upon domestic law can arguably be linked
to the introduction of the CCL, in so far as the Chinese legal mentality is shifting.
Another benefit of the reformed contract law is the predictability of results. Prior
124 Ding Ding, CISG and China, in CISG AND CHINA-THEORY AND PRACTICE:

AN INTERCONTINEN-

TAL EXCHANGE, 33-37 (Michael Will ed., 1999).

125 Feng Chen, The New Era of Chinese Contract Law: History, Development and ComparativeAnalysis, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 153, 169 (2001).
126 Id.

127 Chen, supra note 125, at 169.
128 Frederich Blase, CISG and China-An IntercontinentalExchange, 4 VINDOBONA J. 95, 95 (2000).
129 Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China ("FECL") (1985) in 1 CHINA
LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS: BUSINESS REGULATION (1998). Differences between the CISG and the
FECL are apparent in the area of contract formation, in so far as the FECL has no provisions for offer and
acceptance. Article 7 of the FECL states "A contract is formed when the clauses of contract [sic] are
agreed in written form and signed by the parties. In case one party requests to sign a confirmation letter
when the agreement is reached by the means of letter, telegram, or telex, the contract is only formed upon
the confirmation letter being signed." Even taking into consideration China's reservation under Article 96
of Article 11, Article 7 of the FECL can be interpreted so that it is consistent with Article 8 of the CISG
as there is only one valid way to form a contract and the agreed terms-to reduce all agreements to
writing; see also Fisanich, supra note 120, at 103, 110.
130 Blase, supra note 128, at 95 (but note Friedrich Blase refers to Chinese courts rather than tribunals;
nonetheless a comparison can be made).
131 Id.
132 Id.; Zhang, supra note 20.
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to 1999, depending upon the type of transaction or business relationship,
CIETAC decisions had the appearance of favoring the Chinese party. 133 This
may be attributed to the Chinese party's understanding of the domestic legal system better then the foreign party. With the introduction of a uniform domestic
law, hopefully it will become easier for foreign parties to understand the Chinese
legal system. To what extent the domestic changes will impact CIETAC's interpretation and application of the CISG is unknown. However, one may be optimistic that the current trend of internationally-aligned CIETAC decisions may
continue.
VII.

Conclusion

CIETAC decisions on calculation of lost profits under Article 74 are difficult
to comprehensively evaluate. Because of the lack of fully published decisions
with satisfactory tribunal findings and reasoning, and the slow rate of translation
of published decisions,' 34 it is especially difficult for outsiders to ascertain clear
rules under CIETAC's calculations of lost profits.
To add to the changing face of China's legal system, CIETAC needs to make a
concerted effort to have its decisions published and translated as soon as practicable. CIETAC also needs to refer to academic reasoning behind the CISG in support of its decisions, rather than simply making statements like "the seller shall
pay the buyer's loss of profit resulting from the defective goods, at a rate of 20%
which it deemed to be reasonable."' 135 In this case, the tribunal did not attempt to
explain why twenty percent was deemed to be a reasonable rate; it merely stated
that it was. 136 This arbitrary figure provides no guidance for future parties wishing to litigate or arbitrate, and poses questions as to the uniformity of application
of the CISG as required by Article 7(1).
Providing the obiter dicta for its reasoning rather then the ratio decidendi will
make CIETAC appear more transparent, thereby lending the body more credibility in the international community. It also will provide future parties guidance as
to possible outcomes and predictability of arbitral decisions. In sum, CIETAC's
rulings serve as "a significant gauge of what a practitioner should review prior to
137
representing clients in transactional matters as well as in an arbitral hearing."'
Despite the need for improvements, CIETAC has come a long way. It has
followed the trend of its country's legal system and has adopted practices and
133
134

This is the authors' personal perception from the reading of the cases.
See Fisanich, supra note 120, at 120.

135 Clothes (P.R.C. v. Ger.), CIETAC (2000), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/
cases2/000131c l.html.
136 Another illustration is provided by China 21 September 1992 CIETAC Arbitration proceeding, in
SELECTED WORKS OF CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION AWARDS
(1989-1995) 309-16 (Priscilla Leung Mei-Fun & Wang Sheng-Chang eds., UPDATED TO 1997, AUTHORIZED ENGLISH VERSION, 1998) (where the arbitral tribunal did not attempt to define "reasonable time."

The arbitral tribunal merely indicated that the period in question was beyond what is expected in international trade practice).
137 Allison Butler, Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods in China, 21 INT'L LIT. Q. 1, 4
(2006), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/butler5.html.
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procedures making it sufficiently advanced. The trend in the calculation of lost
profits under Article 74 of the CISG by CIETAC, appears to be consistent with
the interpretation and application of the CISG. The tentative conclusion, focusing only on pre-January 2000 cases, is that a shift toward accepted international
interpretations of Article 74 can be observed and that a shift away from an ethnocentric approach is taking place. Allison Butler, in examining eleven post-January 2000 cases, reached the same tentative conclusion. 38 However, eleven cases
are not an adequate statistical demographic from which to draw definitive conclusions and further research is needed once post-January 2000 cases become
39
available. 1
It is sometimes forgotten, but one must remember what a great feat CIETAC
is, considering the circumstances under which the body operates. CIETAC exists
in a country trying to find a balance between maintaining a socialist state while
undertaking significant free-market reforms demanded by capitalist-backed
globalization. Could it be more difficult?

138 See id., at 4-5.

139 In the opinion of Al Kritzer, at least 200 post-2000 CIETAC decisions have not yet been made
available for translation (e-mail on file with authors).
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